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1. Introduction
Inflation and the low indexation of bend points in the first half of the 1990s 
substantially reduced the dependence of newly granted old-age pensions on 
previous earnings. The pension reform from 1996 created a ‘pension insurance’ 
with two ‘amounts’: flat-rate and earnings-related. Each pensioner receives a flat-
rate basic pension, replacing the previous universal ‘state compensation 
contribution’ of 1990, which compensated the cancellation of retail price 
subsidies. Its amount is now 10% of the national average earnings (NAE).  
The earnings-related ‘percentage amount‘ of the pension generates a partial 
dependence of pension on previous lifetime earnings, adjusted by bend points and 
reduction coefficients: the crucial earnings are reduced to just 26% once the first 
low bend point of 44% is exceeded. Current second bend point is 400% of NAE 
with the reduction coefficient 0%. Figure 1 shows these current parameters of the 
Czech ‘pension insurance’. The ‘progressivity’ of this system is high: a newly 
granted old-age pension is roughly by 30% earnings-related. Thus, 70% of it is  
a Beveridge type pension. This is a rarity in Central Europe as ‘Bismarck’ clearly 
dominates in all neighboring countries.  
Fig. 1. Newly granted (net) old-age pension in relation to lifetime earnings,  
in % of NAE in 2020 (45 years of insurance)  
Source: Author. 
The transformation of the Czechoslovak predominantly Bismarckian pension 
system into the Czech predominantly Beveridgean system was influenced by the 
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poorly understandable calculation of both newly granted old-age pensions and 
indexation (valorization) of pensions. Recently, the marketing approach of 
politicians on these issues has also contributed to strengthening the levelling of 
pensions. More than half of Czechs nevertheless prefer ‘Bismarck’ to ‘Beveridge’. 
In 2010, the Czech Constitutional Court concluded that ‘whole complex design  
of the pension system is non-transparent to a degree that it is de facto 
incomprehensible for its addressees; and for the majority of the insureds the 
calculated amount of the pension benefit becomes unverifiable’ (Czech 
Constitutional Court 2010). In addition, the court declared the provisions of the 
Pension Insurance Act on bend points unconstitutional, ‘because in its 
consequences and in combination with other parameters and the existing 
construction of the pension system it does not guarantee a sufficiently 
constitutionally guaranteed right to adequate material security in accordance with 
… the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and it leads to unacceptable
inequalities between different groups of pension insureds’ (Czech Constitutional 
Court 2010). The Constitutional Court abolished the section of the Act containing 
the bend points and reduction coefficients and it forced the government to react 
quickly; the government has reintroduced the first bend point within the scope  
of the so-called small pension reform. Unfortunately, this reform (2011) did not 
increase the transparency and clarity of the pension system. The only 
comprehensible parameter of the Czech ‘pension insurance’ has been the basic 
pensionable age, which is differentiated for women according to the number  
of children raised (a remnant of the Communist pension policy). To date, it has 
also not been possible to establish a comprehensible system of indexing the 
percentage amount of pensions; after the introduction of parameterization of the 
basic pension amount, the indexation of the percentage amount of the old-age 
pension depends on the total room for increasing the average old-age pension, the 
increase in the basic amount being deducted; so far, no one has even tried  
to explain the logic of this dependence of the indexation of the percentage-based 
amount on the valorization of the basic pension amount.  
The fundamental challenge for Czech ‘pension insurance’ is its paradigmatic  
or rather technical reform, which would lead to the clarity and meaningful 
combination of the Beveridge (non-insurance) and Bismarck (insurance) 
components of this ‘system’. 
2. Proposal for a small pension reform
The non-restoration of the previous second bend point in the key range from 44% 
to 400% of NAE in 2011 created the preconditions for a simple reform of the basic 
and percentage amounts of the old-age pension without fundamentally changing 
the total amount of the old-age pension. Taking into account that earnings up  
to 44% of NAE are basically an exception, we can increase the total old-age 
pension in this range so that the total amount curve ‘straightens’ according to the 
grade of the straight line demonstrating the dependence of the total pension 
amount in the 44-400% of NAE range. The result of this operation is an increase 
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in the basic old-age pension amount from 10% to 32% of NAE and a reduction 
in the pension rate for 1 year of insurance from 1.5% to 1.5 * 0.26 = 0.39%  
see Figure 1. 
Fig. 2. Small pension reform: newly granted (net) old-age pension in relation to 
lifetime earnings, in % of NAE in 2020 (45 years of insurance) 
Source: Author. 
The outlined small pension reform does not change anything for the absolute majority 
of old-age pensioners. Only those whose pension is calculated from a wage lower than 
44% of NAE will ‘profit’ from it. (The costs of this reform are some CZK 7 bn. only, 
according to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.) I believe that such a small 
pension reform can be feasibly implemented in a span of one year. Its main effect will 
be a demonstration of the real ‘progressivity’ of the Czech pension system: it will be 
clear to everyone that ‘pension insurance’ is not, in fact, mainly a social pension 
insurance, but a flat-rate pension. I assume that later the interest in changing the 
structure in favor of earnings-related pensions will prevail. In order to facilitate this 
restructuring, it would be useful to cancel the parameterization of the basic old-age 
pension amount (32% NAE) and set a fixed sum for this amount: under the conditions 
of 2020, it would be CZK 11,141 per month (near the OECD poverty threshold). This 
redefinition of the basic pension amount will also allow for a substantial simplification 
of the indexation of the (new) earnings-related pension amount, which will become 
understandable – as well as the indexation of the basic old-age pension amount.  
Disability pensions can continue to ‘copy’ the old-age pension formula after the small 
pension reform. For survivor pensions, it will be necessary to derive separately their 
basic and earnings-related pension amounts, as we have derived the rationalized the 
basic and earnings-related old-age pension amounts.   
The key objective of the small pension reform is the ‘irreversible’ removal of the basic 
bend point used in calculating the earnings-related amount of old-age pension. This 
will significantly increase the understandability of the Czech pension system. A small 
pension reform can be implemented by the current Czech government, with the 
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3. Proposal for a major reform of public pensions
A consistent pension reform requires the division of the Czech current ‘pension 
insurance’ into two pension pillars: pillar 0 and pillar 1, according to the World 
Bank classification. Pillar 0, in its starting form a flat-rate pension at 32% of NAE, 
shall be financed from general taxes. On the other hand, the insurance pension 
(pillar 1) is to be financed from the social pension contributions, which does not 
exclude the financing of childcare credits from the state budget.  
Significant differences should or could be made in the basic conditions for 
entitlement to the flat-rate pension and the insurance pension. The vesting period 
for (insurance) pension entitlement should be no more than 5 years. By contrast, 
a full flat-rate pension may continue to be subject to paying insurance premiums 
or, more generally, taxes (or length of stay) for 35 years – as is the case in the  
UK today.   
Modern social pension insurance products include: 
 Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) system of individual pension accounts, 
in which the resulting balance of the account is converted into a lifetime 
pension according to actuarial principles, including the application of adequate 
mortality tables. The NDC generic scheme has also built-in stabilization 
mechanisms in the valorization of individual accounts as well as in the 
indexation of pensions. 
 ‘Points system’, where for each insurance year the client receives a fraction 
where the numerator is the client’s wage (up to the earnings ceiling) and the 
denominator is represented by the national average earning (NAE); the client 
accumulates the points until the old-age pension is granted, the law and the 
government set a point value (e.g. EUR 31.03) for each year, thus providing 
the actual amount of the pension paid.  
 (Austrian) pension accounts system, where pension entitlements are credited 
every year, calculated according to the pension formula e.g. 1.78% * annual 
wage of the insured, with the valorization of pension accounts using the wage 
index (amount of granted yearly old-age pension = final balance of the pension 
account), with indexation of paid pensions according to the law.  
In 2003, World Bank expertise for the Czech Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
(Chłoń-Domińczak 2003) recommended us to move to the NDC system. Two 
options were recommended here as a solidarity pillar: flat-rate or minimum 
pension. On my recommendation, the Czech Social Democratic Party subscribed 
to the transition to this system. However, a simulation of the NDC system in the 
first Bezděk's Pension Commission was accompanied by putting a ceiling on the 
pensionable age at 65 years, which suggested that NDC pensions would be very 
low at the end of the century. Until recently, Bezděk was claiming on the basis  
of this ‘analysis’ that the NDC system is not suitable for Czechia because pensions 
would be low (Mediafax.cz 2010). The lesson learned is trivial: any pension 
system can be ‘destroyed’ by bad parameters.  
All three products, which fit into a modern social pension insurance system, are 
transparent and understandable. After learning the relatively new Austrian 
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pension accounts system, I am in favor of its introduction in Czechia. It is 
a defined benefit system and its novelty consists in the fact that the insurance 
pension for the given year is definitively calculated after the end of this calendar 
year – see table 1. The Czech allowance would be calculated according to the 
formula 0.39% * annual assessment basis, which includes not only earnings, but 
also the basis for calculating sickness and other benefits, as well as e.g. valuation 
of childcare. Such care can be valued, for example, by the average national wage 
– just like, for example, in the German points system. The annual calculation
of pension entitlement (account balance after the end of the year) would be an 
important contribution to the comprehensibility of Czech social pension insurance. 




(1.78% * annual 
assessment basis) 
Account after the year 
(valorization of account after 
previous year + increment) 
2005 30,000 534.00 534.00 
2006 31,000 551.80 1 096.48 
2007 32,000 569.60 1 688.01 
… 
2047 72,000 1 281.60 57 365.13 
2048 73,000 1 299.40 59 811.83 
2049 74,000 1 317.20 62 325.27 
Source: SVS (2020). 
The preparation of the major pension reform bill would take 1 to 2 years and we 
might implement the pension accounts system in waves, as it was done in Austria: 
to start with new insureds, continue with e.g. 10 following years of birth and only 
in the further wave extend the system to the remaining clients incl. persons of pre-
pensionable age.  
The major reform of public pensions will also include a reform of disability and 
survivor pensions. The existing Czech disability pensions use the ‘pension-type’ 
concept of disability pensions: their construction is parallel to the construction  
of old-age pensions (Browne et al. 2018); disability is conceived as a kind of 
premature aging, or loss of ability to work. An alternative, more modern is the 
‘sickness’ concept of disability benefits, conceiving disability primarily as  
a prolonged illness, until resuming work (if possible). Disability benefits/ 
compensations are part of the sickness benefit system under this concept. Norway 
is one of the countries which apply the sickness benefit concept of disability 
pensions. Since 2015, the disability pension has been provided as 66% of the final 
wage (average wage in the best three of the last five years before disability; 
earnings ceiling), with a minimum disability pension at 40-50% of NAE, applying 
even to persons without previous employment. The minimum degree of disability 
is 50% (Støve et al. 2015). Since 2011, Norway has introduced an NDC-type old-
age pension system, supplemented by the ‘guarantee pension’. Pensions and other 




the Czech disability pensions (and all sickness insurance benefits) in the same 
manner, including the cancellation of bend points.  
The old-age pension system with a predominance of a flat-rate pension is best paired 
with a flat-rate orphan pension, in our country up to 25% of NAE. The flat-rate orphan 
pension (for orphans aged 10 and over) is of similar amount in the Netherlands, where 
the individual's flat-rate old-age pension is equal to about 30% of NAE. Such an 
orphan pension may be classified as a family benefit. It is not only from the 
perspective of Czech pensioners that universal child benefits should replace the 
current refundable child tax credit), which cannot be claimed by not only low-income 
families but also by non-earning pensioners, because they are not subject to the 
personal income tax. The decisive argument for the transition from universal child 
benefits to child tax allowances in our country was an effort to compel ‘non-adaptable’ 
citizens living on social assistance benefits to take up employment. Apparently, 
advocates of these views did not even try to make a simple example to confirm their 
ideas; the fact is that in the universal child benefit scheme, only the final social 
assistance benefit (subsistence benefit) is (substantially) reduced: by child benefits 
paid. The very discrimination against Czech pensioners as regards the tax credit for 
children may, of course, be eliminated by introducing taxation of old-age and 
disability pensions; but this is not foreseen in the framework of the major pension 
reform: we are postponing the solution of this problem for the future.  
The importance of widow pensions has long been declining in the western 
countries, also as a result of the unification of social insurance systems. The trend 
is to move to a ‘bridging’ widow/widower pension, paid for 6 to 12 months after 
the spouse's death – so that the surviving spouse can adapt to the new situation. 
(Widely conceived costs of raising orphans should be concentrated in the amount 
of orphan pension.) Modern systems of social old-age pension allow for the 
sharing of pension entitlements of couples. In any case, it is advisable to introduce 
into Czech law the sharing of pension entitlements of divorced couples, unless 
there is another agreement reached during the divorce proceedings.  
The key content of the proposed major pension reform is the reform of old-age 
pensions: the transition to a flat-rate pension, funded by general taxes, and the 
transition to a modern social old-age insurance system. In the interest of this 
transition to the two-pillar system in a relatively short period of time, it may be 
advisable to postpone the solution of some other issues that we mentioned in this 
section of the paper.  
 
4. Reform of personal pensions  
The introduction of the ‘supplementary pension insurance with state contribution’ 
in 1994 was a relatively positive step towards the development of financial 
services not only in the area of pension savings – new distribution networks were 
established and developed. The state contribution played an important role  
in kick-starting the pension pillar 3. With the rapid growth in the number  
of ‘supplementary pension insurance’ contracts, a strong pension lobby was 




of insurance companies was also partially successful. The result was the 
emergence of a segmented system of the pension pillar 3, which is unprecedented 
in the world. The number of the supplementary pension insurance contracts at the 
end of 2012 exceeded 5 million. In addition, there were 3.5 million ‘private life 
insurance’ contracts, of which about 1.5 million contracts drew deduction from 
the income tax base.   
The major pension reform of 2013 increased the transparency of supplementary 
pension insurance and introduced cost limits for the pension companies, but it did not 
affect private life insurance, tax deductions and non-payment of income tax and social 
and health insurance premiums in the case of employer contributions to 
supplementary pension insurance or private life insurance. The indirect state support 
for employer contributions is highest in the world, accounting for 65% of the 
employer contribution. State support for citizens' contributions is ‘only’ above 
average in an international comparison (OECD 2018), since this comparison assumes 
contributions of 5% of wage (the products compared in other countries are 
occupational pensions where the situation is significantly different!). The calculation 
also reflects the low rate (15%) of the Czech personal income tax. The Czech state 
support of supplementary pension savings in the form of employer contribution is 2,4 
times higher than the support of the same product in the form of a participant's 
contribution (if 5% of wage are to be saved). All state regulation of the state-supported 
pillar 3 should be – by its very nature – uniform.  
The main purpose of taking out Czech supplementary pension insurance is not 
individual protection in old age, let alone in a form of an annuity. The main 
purpose is the tax optimization and getting rid of excess liquidity. The 
construction of the product taken out till the end of 2012 was of fundamental 
importance for its high penetration: it was essentially a simple savings product, 
with high explicit state support in the form of a state contribution, with a guarantee 
of a non-negative nominal yield. Fiscal illusion, based on the assumption that the 
state support is for free, also played an important role. All of this explains the 
unusually high number of participants. ‘Personal pensions have relatively wide 
take-up in only a few Member States (over 60% coverage in the Czech Republic, 
over 30% in … Germany) while in most Member States take-up is moderate and 
fragmented, and in some, nearly non-existent’ (EC 2017). In general, ‘ the third 
pillar is not really a pension scheme. It is akin to a tax-advantaged savings account. 
The system should not be presented to the public as a source of meaningful future 
replacement income’ (WB 2017). If we think this through to all its consequences, 
we come to the conclusion that: ‘Pillar 3 (voluntary retirement savings) should not 
receive tax subsidies, which are regressive and, in any case, have not been shown 
to have any significant effect on private saving’ (Willmore 2000). Therefore, the 
persistently repeated ideas of some Czech party experts that the impact of the 
ageing population can be solved by pension savings in the third pillar are 
completely unrealistic. The standard pension pillar 3 is of no practical importance 






The parallel existence of several Czech systems of generous fiscal support (state 
contribution, tax deductions, exemption of employer contributions from income 
tax and from payment of social and health insurance premiums), even for one 
single product (supplementary pension savings), is unconstitutional, because  
it significantly distorts the (oligopolistic) market and it is also a manifestation of 
clientelism and illiteracy. Last year, public spending (including tax expenditures) 
on these subsidies for supplementary pension savings and private life insurance 
amounted to approximately CZK 22 billion. Real investment returns for clients 
are increasingly negative. Due to the extreme state support and the consequent 
very high number of participants, this (hypertrophic and chaotic) ‘system’ can be 
included in the rank of ‘soft compulsion’. According to the World Bank's 
classification of pension pillars, this is essentially pillar 2, not pillar 3. It is  
a chaotic variant of the neoliberal model of private pensions/savings. More 
efficient systems of this kind use auto-enrolment, opt-out, auto-escalation of 
contributions, matching contributions, mostly in the pillar of occupational pensions.  
Top managers of the pension companies (Poklop, Homolka) recommend the 
introduction of compulsory employer contributions, boosting of state support and 
auto-enrolment of citizens or employees; they like the new 2019 Polish system, 
which is essentially a copy of British workplace pensions. It is a neoliberal pension 
concept that has nothing to do with the typical pillar 3. It must be noted that even 
specialized pension (joint stock) companies do not belong to the third pillar. This 
is a Czech specificity, which arose only because public servants in 1993 did not 
want the new business (supplementary pension insurance with state contribution) 
to fall into the lap of the then almost monopoly Czech Insurance Co. (the reason 
were two increases in premiums for motor liability insurance – in a short time 
interval). The existence of special pension companies is completely unnecessary; 
moreover, almost all these companies outsource most of their activities  
to affiliated companies within their respective financial groups.  
A fundamental reform of the supplementary pension insurance, supplementary 
pension savings and private life insurance is indispensable and, in general,  
we have several options for the ‘public choice’. From a technical point of view, 
liberal policy is the simplest solution: abolishing all fiscal support for financial 
products and reducing taxes. Social democratic policy could have a broader scope: 
the abolition of fiscal support for financial products could be linked to an increase 
in pensions or other social expenditure – for example based on the argument that 
the relative amount of old-age pensions in our country (slightly) lags behind the 
OECD or EU (‘pension gap’). A conservative (Christian Democratic) policy can 
be described as the transition to exclusive tax deductions, with the pay-out  
of pension savings being fully burdened by a personal income tax (EET tax 
regime). This is the most common practice in the world, which is especially 
beneficial for higher income groups, due to the usual existence of progressive 
income tax rates. Under the conditions of a flat-rate income tax rate (as in 




or investments are made from taxed income and the state support has the form of 
an exemption of capital income from taxation. In Czechia, the TEE tax regime 
applies to mutual and investment funds. The TEE tax regime has been increasingly 
recommended around the world over the last decade, at the expense of the EET 
regime, as it is significantly simpler and more equitable (equal approach to all 
income groups); notwithstanding the fact that when applying the EET regime, 
there is a significant risk that tax rates will be different in the future (when, for 
example, entire pension savings are taxed). Thus, the TEE tax regime can be 
unambiguously recommended for Czechia.  
5. Future parametric pension reforms
The current Czech pension ‘system’ requires the above-mentioned fundamental 
reforms to introduce some order/system into it and at the same time to get rid of  
a lobbyist weed that eats up a considerable part of the pension ‘cake’ or the 
national income as such. It would not be surprising if, for example, the social 
pension insurance is to be strengthened at the expense of the flat-rate state pension 
in the coming period – we are not so different from the neighboring nations so that 
the flat-rate old-age pension would have to dominate in our country.  
However, due to the ageing of the population, there will be no need for (further) 
paradigmatic pension reform, despite many experts (and institutions) trying 
to give an impression that it would. The ineffective ‘second’ pension pillar in any 
form will not become effective or at least economically acceptable due to ageing 
of the population. I leave aside the issue of occupational pensions, which are 
basically already past their prime in Western countries. Especially when trade 
unions in our country are too weak in most private sectors to negotiate pensions 
or savings of this kind. (Nevertheless, I recommend lifting the de facto Czech ban 
on occupational pensions.) Pension savings are not even a partial solution to the 
problem of population ageing, even if investment yields should return to the 1990s 
levels. In the upshot, if a miracle were to become and investment returns could be an 
argument for their large-scale use in the pension system, it would have to be 
advantageous to gradually replace taxes as such by those. But this will not happen, 
because the globalized world is full of savings that are difficult to utilize. And many 
governments prefer to borrow from elites instead of taxing them (Streeck 2014).  
Retirement age is one of the essential parameters of pension systems. Flat-rate 
pension generally includes a different concept of the basic pension age than that 
in the social insurance pension. In the solidarity pillar, the statutory pension age 
should be fixed, and in the insurance pillar, the retirement age might be flexible. 
With regard to the now largely prevailing retirement just after reaching the current 
statutory pensionable age, it can be recommended that the pensionable age for the 
basic pension remains fixed (inflexible), preferably at the level of the current basic 
retirement age for men (including its increasing in accordance with the current 
law); raising of the pensionable age of women with children could be accelerated. 
Conversely, in the case of the insurance pension, we can afford – to begin with – 
to set a (minimum) pensionable age at 60-61 years – while concurrently the 
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‘premature’ retirement would be eliminated; the system simplifies. At present 
80% of Czechs could work without problems until the age of 65.  
A family policy reform can contribute to reducing the pace of demographic 
ageing: in particular, the integration of parental allowance into the basic maternity 
benefit, the payment of a new single parental benefit for up to 100 weeks (up to 
150 weeks for twins) from the sickness insurance system, in the amount of the 
gross wage of the mother/father (however, at least 50% of NAE, at most 200%  
of NAE), after deduction of income tax (including the current insurance 
premiums). It is also necessary to introduce the right to a place for all children 
from one year of age in full-day preschool facilities at an affordable price or even 
free of charge of charge (Vostatek 2019). ‘It is also advisable to shorten the 
inefficiently long periods of formal study’ (Münich 2019). ‘The current setting 
of labor taxation, along with parental leave setting and low availability of creches 
and kindergartens contributes to the highest drop in employment of Czech mothers 
with young children across the EU’ (Šatava 2016). This has a considerable impact 
also on the state budget, incl. the pension system. 
6. Conclusions
The 1996 Pension Insurance Act has added a small basic amount of all pensions 
to the system of ‘percentage amounts’ of individual pensions, heavily levelled by 
bend points and reduction coefficients; ‘Beveridge’ prevailed over ’Bismarck’ but 
he left the massive pension insurance premiums live. Substantial conceptual 
contradictions were not removed by later pension reforms. The main problem  
is the lack of transparency and comprehensibility of the system not only for its 
regular clients. With regard to the unpreparedness of the overall reform of public 
pensions, and also of the forthcoming parliamentary elections, we recommend 
dividing this reform into two steps: a small reform and a major reform. Small 
pension reform shall focus on simple but fundamental rationalization of the basic 
and percentage amounts of the old-age pensions. The new basic amount of these 
pensions should be at the level of 32% of the national average earnings; for  
the percentage amount, the valuation of one year of insurance cover shall be 
reduced from 1.5% to 0.39%.   
The major pension reform might be a paradigm reform of old-age, disability and 
survivor pensions. The basic amount of old-age pension will be transformed into  
a separate flat-rate pension, with an independent system of retirement age, 
minimum residence or economic activity (35 years) in Czechia and valorization. 
The percentage amount of the old-age pension will become an independent 
pension pillar of social insurance, optimally with the construction of the Austrian 
pension accounts, with a separate retirement age and valorization system and with 
a minimum insurance period of 3-5 years. Disability pensions can be newly 
designed as social insurance and incorporated into the sickness insurance. Orphan 
pensions may be redefined as a universal, flat-rate benefit. The significance of 
widow and widower pensions may decrease, given the introduction of a flat-rate 
old-age pension and the assumed increase in the (average) orphan pension. 
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All these proposals are based on the pension development trends in the OECD 
countries.   
Only social pension insurance is to be financed by insurance premiums on a model 
basis, which would allow for a substantial reduction in the Czech pension 
insurance premium rate. However, the general economic approach favors the 
cancellation of health insurance premiums – regarding the existing system 
of Czech public health care and due to the absurd conception and structure  
of health insurance premiums and their collection by all seven health insurance 
companies. Anyway, we can simply reduce insurance premiums only by 
integrating employee premiums (11% of gross wage) into the personal income tax 
– which is desirable also in view of the low capital income taxation (when
compared to the western countries and the OECD average). When reforming the 
personal income tax, we get rid of the super gross wage taxation. This reform 
of personal income tax is also important in the interest of reforming pension 
(and building) savings: for political reasons, we need to compensate for the 
reduction in state support for these products by increasing the basic tax credit. 
An increase in this tax credit is also needed in order to increase the progressivity 
of income taxation.  
The extremely complicated system of state support for ‘personal pensions’  
is almost entirely the result of lobbying by the completely superfluous ‘pension 
companies’ that have a monopoly on the provision of supplementary pension 
savings. The rate of state support for employer contributions to these savings  
is 65%, which is by far the highest one in the world. State support for participant 
contributions is lower. More than half of the population is involved in the system, 
but its role in protection is as low as in other countries. The main purpose  
of ‘pension savings’ (and ‘building savings’) is tax optimization, coupled with the 
fiscal illusion that the state support is a free lunch. State support essentially ends 
in the overhead and profit of the providers. In accordance with the relevant social 
models, we recommend either a complete cancellation of state support for  
all financial products or the transition to a uniform TEE regime (exemption 
of returns from income tax) – optimally in the form of British Individual Savings 
Accounts (ISA) or Canadian Tax-Free Savings Accounts (TFSA), where annual 
deposits are limited and withdrawals are unlimited. Not only in our country 
the (previous) housing investments are far more important for (future) pensioners 
than any third pension pillar. 
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